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A
Avoiding Error in Closing Argument
by H. Patrick Furman
T rial lawyers dream of the per-
fect closing argument, in which
they blend fact, emotion and
persuasion to sway an unde-
cided jury to vote their way. Closing ar-
gument is the point at which counsel
can be most dramatic and argumenta-
tive. However, it is important to recog-
nize the limitations on closing argument,
for two reasons. First, closing argument
is the point in trial at which trial lawyers'
emotions are most likely to lead them
astray into unprofessional and even un-
ethical behavior. Secondly, a closing ar-
gument that is interrupted by an objec-
tion and an adverse ruling may lose ef-
fectiveness.
The general principles governing clos-
ing argument are easily stated. The
scope of closing argument is within the
discretion of the trial court, and rulings
thereon will not be disturbed absent a
gross abuse of discretion.' Closing argu-
ment must be confined to the evidence
adduced at trial and the reasonable in-
ferences that can be drawn from that
evidence.2 Counsel may not express per-
sonal opinions concerning the evidence
or witnesses. 3 Counsel may not make
arguments that appeal to the prejudices
of the jury,4 nor inject collateral issues
into closing arguments.5 Prosecutors
may not comment on the post-advise-
ment silence of a defendant.
6
Recognizing and following these basic
rules are not as easy. This article dis-
cusses some of the more common errors
committed in closing argument. Most of
the cases involve the closing arguments
Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman,
University of Colorado School of
Law, Boulder-(303) 492-8126
of prosecutors because of the nature of
the appellate process, but the principles
are applicable to both prosecutors and
defense counsel. Finally, the article dis-
cusses appellate review of claims of er-
ror in closing argument.
Comments on Witness
Credibility
The credibility of one or more witness-
es is often central to the resolution of a
case. Jurors are given an instruction to
guide them in their determination of
credibility issues.7 Clearly, counsel may
argue whether a witness has passed the
credibility test" and may tell the jury
that the jurors make the determination
of whether a witness is credible.9
However, the right to comment on the
credibility of witnesses is not unlimited.
Counsel may not argue credibility in
terms that reflect their personal opin-
ions.10 This rule is particularly strict for
prosecutors: "Expressions of personal
opinion as to the veracity of witnesses
are particularly inappropriate when
made by prosecutors in criminal trials.""
Thus, a statement that a witness "lied"
during his or her testimony has been
held inappropriate,12 as has a statement
that a witness was "honest."13 In both
instances, nevertheless, the court found
the errors harmless because the improp-
er comments were a small part of the
summation and because the jury was
properly instructed that closing argu-
ments are not evidence. In People v. Tru-
jillo, 4 however, comments that the de-
fendant's statement was "riddled with
lies" were held to rise to the level of plain
error and justify reversal of the defen-
dant's conviction. The Colorado Court of
Appeals in Trujillo reiterated that the
impropriety in such arguments is that
they amount to an expression of person-
al opinion as to the truth or falsity of tes-
timony.
A defendant who testifies is subject to
the same sort of credibility attack as any
other witness. If a defendant laughs dur-
ing the testimony of other witnesses and
during the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment, it is not plain error for the prose-
cutor to argue that these actions go to
the credibility of the defendant. 15
Injection of Collateral Issues
Closing argument should be confined
to issues relating to guilt or innocence.'
6
It is improper for counsel to inject collat-
eral issues, such as sympathy for a de-
fendant or fear about the general crime
problem, into closing argument. For ex-
ample, it has been held improper for ei-
ther counsel to ask jurors to "stand in
the shoes" of a witness, victim or defen-
dant. 7
A reference to the general problem of
drugs in society and the role of police
and informants in combatting that prob-
lem has been held improper. 8 A sugges-
tion that drugs were being offered to the
"men, women and children of Denver"
was held improper when there was no
evidence presented as to the persons for
whom the drugs were intended. 19 Sim-
ply injecting the broader issue of drugs
in schools also has been held improper.20
Attempting to inflame a jury by sug-
gesting that the defendant has engaged
in other illegal activity violates the gener-
al ban on evidence of other uncharged of-
fenses and improperly shifts the jury's at-
tention away from the issues in a case.
21
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In a kidnapping case where the victim
was an adult but there was evidence that
the defendant wanted photographs of
young nude children, a suggestion that
candy in the defendant's glove box might
have been used to solicit young children
was held to appeal improperly to the sym-
pathy and prejudice of the jury.22 Assert-
ing that there was a "good argument"
that the defendant had engaged in an-
other crime, after the defendant had been
acquitted of that crime, is improper.23
Attempting to inflame a jury by char-
acterizing the defendant as an animal is
improper. In People v. Hernandez, the
Colorado Court of Appeals said: "The
courts have condemned as improper a
prosecutor using such terms as 'rat,'
'dog' or 'animal' to describe a defen-
dant."24 While this comment was made
in connection with an opening statement,
the cases cited and the opinion itself sug-
gest that the condemnation extends to
every phase of the trial. The Hernandez
court described the prosecutor's comment
that "sometimes it takes a rat to catch a
rat.. ." as inflammatory, derogatory, de-
humanizing, inconsistent with the pros-
ecutor's role and dignity and improper.25
Similarly, a reference in closing argument
to the defendant as a "lion" who stalked
"weak prey" has been held improper,26
although not plain error, in the context
of the facts of the case, the instructions
of law and the arguments of the defense
counsel.
Inviting, even implicitly, the jury to
draw inferences about the defendant from
evidence that had been barred is an im-
proper argument calculated to inflame
the jury.27
Comments on Silence
Of Defendant
In People v. Reynolds, the Colorado Su-
preme Court stated:
Any comment on the post-arrest si-
lence of a defendant once he invokes
his right to remain silent may well vio-
late a defendant's due process rights.28
Two principles underlie this rule. First,
the government should not be allowed
to punish citizens for exercising a consti-
tutional right.29 Second, every post-ad-
visement silence is ambiguous because
the silence may simply be nothing more
than the citizen's exercise of the right
and not an indication of any conscious-
ness of guilt.3 Comment of this sort has
been held to amount to plain error and
to justify reversal even in the absence of
a contemporaneous objection.3l
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The analysis is different if the silence
occurs before the advisement. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that it is proper
to impeach a testifying defendant with
his or her pre-arrest silence. 32 That Court
also has reasoned that post-arrest, pre-
advisement silence is not based on any
governmental inducement or implicit of-
fer and has held that the use of such si-
lence to impeach the defendant's testi-
mony at trial did not violate either the
Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment.3
"Closing argument is the
point at which trial lawyers'
emotions are most likely to
lead them astray into
unprofessional and even
unethical behavior."
The Colorado Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed this issue but has
acknowledged the inherent ambiguity of
a defendant's post-arrest silence. In Peo-
ple v. Quintana,3 the defendant remained
silent after arrest (it was unclear when,
or if, an advisement was given) and then
presented at trial, through witnesses oth-
er than himself, a defense of duress. The
court noted that the defendant's silence
could be interpreted in a number of dif-
ferent ways and that it was, therefore,
so ambiguous and lacking in probative
value as to be inadmissible as substan-
tive evidence to disprove duress against a
nontestifying defendant.
3 5
A situation that frequently arises is
how to handle the "silence" of a defen-
dant who is silent as to some details but
not others. Clearly, if there are inconsis-
tencies between the post-arrest state-
ments and the trial testimony, the de-
fendant may be impeached with the in-
consistencies, 36 and the inconsistencies
can then be used in the closing argu-
ment. The omission of a significant de-
tail may amount to such an inconsisten-
cy,37 but if the trial testimony merely
augments, rather than contradicts, the
original statement, it is improper to al-
low impeachment using the original
statement or closing argument com-
menting on the original statement.'
Another recurring situation is that of
a defendant who falls silent only after
initially making a statement. It is im-
proper to question a defendant about this
sort of silence or to use such silence in
closing argument to infer guilt.3
9
During closing argument in People v.
7bdd, ° the prosecutor, after going through
the facts, said, "I believe there is no con-
tradiction. Defendant will agree to that.
There is no other evidence at this point."
In affirming the conviction, the Colora-
do Supreme Court considered whether
(1) the comments specifically focused on
the defendant's failure to testify, (2) a lim-
iting instruction was given, (3) the com-
ments were aggravated or repetitive and
(4) the defendant was the only person
who could have refuted the evidence that
was the subject of the comments. 41
A comment on the silence of the de-
fendant is particularly improper if it al-
so misleads the jury. In People v. Bur-
ress,42 the prosecutor asked questions
which implied that the defendant refused
to talk with the police and then comment-
ed on this implication. In fact, the defen-
dant had never been questioned by the
police, so the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction.
43
Use of Instructions/Law
Clearly, counsel may use the relevant
law and jury instructions during closing
argument. Nevertheless, counsel must
state the law accurately and may not
make personal comments on the law
and instructions or personal comments
about the other party's use of the law. It
is improper to call into question the in-
structions given by the trial court." Fur-
ther, much to the dismay of law faculties
everywhere, it has been held proper for
a trial court to refuse to allow counsel to
read from a law review article, on the
theory that doing so usurps the func-
tions of the jury instructions.45
It has been held improper for a prose-
cutor to suggest to a jury that guilty
people prefer jury trials, while innocent
people prefer trials to the court.46 It is
not improper for a prosecutor to note that
everyone who is convicted of a crime en-
joyed the presumption of innocence at
the outset of trial: this is merely a prop-
er comment that the evidence adduced
at trial may overcome the presumption
of innocence. 47 It is improper to shift or
misstate the burden of proof, but it is not
improper to respond to a defense argu-
ment that the prosecution failed to inves-
tigate other suspects by noting that the
defense saw the same information as the
prosecution and did not produce informa-
tion suggesting another person commit-
ted the offense."s
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It is not improper for counsel to com-
pare the evidence to the instructions and
argue that a lesser included instruction
is not applicable by merely pointing out
inconsistencies, 49 but it is improper to
tell the jury that opposing counsel re-
quested a particular instruction.50
The Court of Appeals declared harm-
less error the decision of a trial court to
refuse to allow the defense to comment
on the fact that a prosecution witness ex-
ercised the right against self-incrimina-
tion and refused to testify and that the
prosecution refused to immunize the wit-
ness. The court noted that the situation
might be different if the witness did not
testify due to the actions of the prosecu-
tion.51 Similarly, it has been held improp-
er to comment on a defendant's invoca-
tion of the spousal privilege.
52
It is improper for counsel to make dis-
paraging remarks about the theory or
tactics of opposing counsel. Describing
counsel's theory as "insulting" or "a lie,"
calling the cross-examination "cheap in-
nuendo" and questioning counsel's good
faith have resulted in a reversal of the
defendant's conviction.5 3 These sorts of
arguments constitute improper com-
ments on the right to use the law and pre-
sent a defense. They are inflammatory,
divert the jury from the issues at hand
and amount to forbidden expressions of
personal opinion.
Misleading Arguments
While closing arguments may include
all reasonable and legitimate inferences,
even if the inferences are illogical or er-
roneous, 54 "closing arguments to the ju-
ry... may not be utilized to mislead the
jury." 55 It has been held improper for de-
fense counsel to engage in "flights of
fancy" by arguing that the defendant
found the stolen property when there
was no evidence to support the argu-
ment, and proper for the trial court to
preclude the further use by counsel of
such hypotheticals that lacked factual
foundation.56
In a theft by receiving case involving
guns, when the guns were in the posses-
sion of the authorities at the time of trial,
the prosecutor nonetheless asked, rhe-
torically, "So where is the proof of these
three other guns?"5 7 The court charac-
terized this comment as "unfair [and]
misleading"58 and held that it under-
mined the fundamental fairness of the
trial.
Counsel crosses the line from argu-
ment into improper conduct by arguing
a theory that has no evidentiary support.
A wholly speculative argument that a
murder was motivated by the poverty-
stricken defendant's desire to rob the vic-
tim has been held to be unprofessional
conduct.59 A speculative argument that
the defendant might have had to load
his gun when he retrieved it from his
home, made to bolster a claim of premed-
itation, was similarly condemned, al-
though the error was found harmless
because the defendant was acquitted on
the premeditation charge.60
Opening the Door
It is clear that improper argument by
one attorney may open the door to what
would otherwise be an inappropriate ar-
gument by opposing counsel. The princi-
ple was stated in Kurtz v. People as "[Dle-
fense counsel may by improper argumen-
tative comment open the door to a re-
sponse by the prosecuting attorney"61
and in People v. Vialpando as "A prose-
cutor is afforded considerable latitude in
the right to reply to a remark by oppos-
ing counsel."
62
In People v. Becker, defense counsel
argued that he could personally vouch
for the integrity of the defendant and
that the mens rea element in the offense
was necessary to prevent "our police and
prosecutors from becoming a Gestapo."63
The prosecutor, in rebuttal, "threatened
to abandon the prosecution of teenagers
who committed burglaries if the jury ac-
quitted the defendant."64 In light of the
defense counsel's comments, the lack of
a contemporaneous objection and the in-
structions to the jury, the Colorado Su-
preme Court affirmed the conviction.
The dissent argued that prosecutorial
misconduct should not be excused sim-
ply because defense counsel misbehaved
as well.
Where a murder defendant hugged
and kissed his mother after she testified,
the Court of Appeals held that it was
not improper for the prosecutor to note
in closing that the victim would never
again get to kiss his mother, because the
defendant's actions had opened the door
to the comment.6 5 That court has also
held that it was proper for a prosecutor
to argue that "there was only one eye-
witness to the crime" and that the pros-
ecution has no control over the number
of witnesses to a crime after the defense
attacked the credibility of the victim/
witness.6 6 In a third case, the Court of
Appeals held that a closing argument ac-
cusing the other side of using "smoke
DNA
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screens" and "dirty evidence" opened the
door to a rebuttal that was otherwise im-
proper.
67
Scope of Appellate Review
There are two important factors affect-
ing appellate review of alleged error in
closing argument. The first is whether
there was a contemporaneous objection
to the allegedly improper argument. The
second is whether the error was harm-
less when considered in the context of the
entire closing argument and trial.
Many lawyers are more reluctant to
object during closing argument than at
other points in a trial. They reason that
closing argument is, after all, argument
and that both sides should have great
latitude to interpret and argue the evi-
dence. However, counsel must be aware
that a failure to make a contemporane-
ous objection during closing argument
can adversely impact the chances of win-
ning on appeal.
In the absence of a contemporaneous
objection, Colorado's appellate courts will
reverse a conviction on grounds of error
in closing argument only if there is a
"gross abuse of discretion,"68 or an error
that is so significant as to undermine
the fundamental fairness of the trial6 9 or
"as to cast serious doubt on the reliabili-
ty of the judgment of conviction."70 In
fact, a reviewing court may refuse even
to consider an argument of misconduct
in closing argument when there was no
contemporaneous objection.7'
The other side of this coin is that when
counsel contemporaneously objects to a
comment, and the objection is sustained,
appellate courts will normally hold that
a curative instruction overcomes the er-
ror unless the error"is so prejudicial that,
but for the comment, the jury might not
have found the defendant guilty."72 The
appellate courts operate on the assump-
tion that jurors follow their instructions.7 3
Although the courts do not use the
phrase "totality of the circumstances" in
the decisions discussing error in closing
argument, it is clear that the courts view
the alleged error in the context of the en-
tire closing argument. Errors in closing
argument have been held harmless be-
cause the error was viewed as a relative-
ly small and unimportant aspect of the
entire argument. For example, in People
v. Huggins,74 the Court of Appeals de-
scribed the improper arguments as a
"small and insignificant part" of the en-
tire closing argument and affirmed the
conviction despite the impropriety.
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Improper argument concerning a count
on which the defendant is acquitted will
normally be held harmless. Thus, im-
proper argument concerning a count of
murder after deliberation was held harm-
less when the defendant was acquitted
of that charge and convicted of felony
murder instead.
75
Most appellate decisions review situa-
tions in which the trial court has al-
lowed certain arguments. In People v.
Raibon,76 the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a trial court erred in bar-
ring defense counsel from commenting
on a missing prosecution witness. The
court held that any error was harmless
because the only possible prejudice to
the defendant was that it undercut his
efforts to claim that all of the witnesses
were engaged in a conspiracy to finger
him. He was allowed to argue this theo-
ry, and the absence of the other witness
was obvious. Thus, the trial court's re-
fusal to allow specific comment did not
contribute to the conviction or affect the
fairness of the trial.
Conclusion
Trial lawyers love to argue. They par-
ticularly love closing argument because
they can be at their persuasive and ar-
gumentative best. However, the very
emotion that contributes to an effective
closing may also lead counsel into un-
professional and unethical behavior. In
the heat of trial, it is sometimes easy to
lose sight of professional responsibili-
ties, but every unprofessional argument
adversely affects the reliability of jury
verdicts and the criminal justice system.
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Training Courses for Legal Secretaries and Support Staff Begin in January
*The Denver Legal Secretaries Association ("DLSA") is again offering the Basic Legal Secretary Training Course and
the Professional Legal Secretary/Accredited Legal Secretary Training Course. Details about each course are given
below.
Basic Legal Secretary Raining Course
This course is designed for legal secretaries and support staff who have minimal law office experience or whose experience
has been limited to a specialized area of the law. It will be held on Thursday evenings from January 19 through March 16.
The course will be taught by local attorneys, educators and Certified Professional Legal Secretaries and is a structured pro-
gram with twenty-four hours of concentrated study covering all major areas of the law. The course provides legal, procedural
and office management background necessary to perform efficiently and effectively, with an emphasis on practical information
that can be put to immediate use in the law office.
The DLSA Basic Legal Secretary Training Course represents a unique opportunity to enhance the competency and efficiency
of law office support personnel. For the student, the course can mean career advancement and greater job satisfaction; for the
employer, it is a cost-effective investment in a better-trained, more productive staff.
For more information about the Basic Legal Secretary Training Course, call Linda Chandler, Certified PLS, at (303) 634-4453.
Professional Legal Secretary ("PLS")/Accredited Legal Secretary ("ALS") Training Course
This course is taught by local attorneys, educators and members of DLSA who have attained PLS certification. A PLS is an
individual with at least three years' experience as a legal secretary who demonstrates ability to interact on a professional level
with attorneys, clients, judges and co-workers; assumes responsibility; exercises initiative and judgment; has a working knowl-
edge of procedural law and research; and works with a minimum of supervision. The PLS Training Course prepares the ad-
vanced legal secretary to sit for a two-day examination administered by the National Association of Legal Secretaries Interna-
tional® ("NALS"), which covers written communication skills and knowledge; ethics; legal secretarial procedures; legal secre-
tarial accounting; legal termination, techniques and procedures; exercise of judgment; and legal secretarial skills.
An ALS is an individual with at least one year of experience as a legal secretary or equivalent legal secretarial training who
wishes to demonstrate a commitment to and aptitude for succeeding in the ever-changing legal environment. The course, de-
signed to prepare individuals to take the PLS examination, also provides valuable information for individuals wishing to take
the ALS examination. The six-hour written ALS exam demonstrates ability to perform business communication tasks; gauges
ability to maintain office records and calendars and prioritize multiple tasks when given "real life" scenarios; measures under-
standing of office equipment and related procedures; denotes aptitude for understanding legal terminology, legal complexities
and supporting documents; assesses recognition of accounting terms to resolve accounting problems; and appraises knowledge
of law office protocol as prescribed by ethical codes. The one-day ALS examination is divided into three parts: written commu-
nication, comprehension and application; office administration, legal terminology and accounting; and ethics, human relations
and applied office procedures.
The DLSA Professional Legal Secretary/Accredited Legal Secretary Training Course will be held on successive Thursdays,
from February 2 through March 16. For more information, call De Anne Larrow, Certified PLS at (303) 980-1077.
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